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1-Introduction  
 
Complex information 
processing systems (IPS) are systems 
that process a special type of object 
called information. They transform their 
input into some sort of code, process it 
in a complex fashion and produce some 
expected output. But, when the time 
comes to give a formal definition of 
what is an IPS, things are not so clear. 
Here are a few typical samples of these 
definitions:  
"[An information system] is a real 
world system, or a bounded portion of 
that system. That is the subject of an 
information system. " (Flavin, 1981: 
24).  
 " An information processing system 
[…] is a computer based system that 
represents, maintains and provides 
access to large amount of information 
about a domain. Intelligent 
information systems are information 
systems which include components 
built through AI technology. "  
(Mylopoulos et al., 1993: 206) 
As one can see, such definitions 
are very general if not redundant. And to 
give a sharper one, we must understand the 
concepts on which they are based, such 
as system, process, and most of all 
information. This last concept is the key 
one: it is the object on which a process is 
said to be applied. But what is information? 
What kind of object is this?1 Recently, 
some answers have been given to these 
questions.  
A first one, coming from the 
classical trend of cognitive sciences has 
asserted repeatedly that the real nature of 
information is " representational ". The 
main hypothesis of this position is that 
processing information for a cognitive 
system is to manipulate something that 
«stands» for something else that is to say, 
represents something else.  
                                               
1
 We all know about the Shannon type 
definition of information. But this is not a definition 
but a measure of the probability of information. It 
leaves the concept, as Drestke (1982 ) said, 
quite undetermined.  
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We are dealing with information-
processing machines, and the way 
such machines work is by using 
symbols to stands for things to 
represent things, in our terminology. " 
Marr, 1980: p. 21 
This hypothesis can be found in 
cybernetics (Turing, 1937; Ashby, 1956; 
Von Neumann, 1958; Pylyshyn 1984) in 
artificial intelligence (Newell and 
Simon,1976) in analytical philosophical 
of mind (Fodor, 1975; Dennett, 1978; 
Haugeland, 1986). It is also to be found 
in more recent emergent models of IPS 
such as connectionists, (Rumelhart and 
Mc Lelland, 1987; Smolensky, 1988; 
etc.), genetic algorithms (Holland, 1975) 
etc..  
 Many critics have been 
formulated against this hypothesis. The 
most classic ones are inspired by 
Wittgenstein (Cummins, 1989) for 
whom the concept of representation does 
not have much explanatory power. 
Others, (Dennett, 1978; Clark 1989; 
Putnam,1988) call upon the infinite 
regression argument, that is, 
representations require an interpreter or 
a homunculus that understands this 
representation but who himself uses a 
representation to do so and hence need, 
in turn, another interpreter, and so ad 
infinitum. Connectionists do not accept 
the symbolic form of these 
representations and talk about 
subsymbolic forms of representation. 
More radical are the critics 
coming from theories of complex 
dynamical systems. Authors like 
Moravec (1988), Chalmers (1991), Van 
Gelder (1997), Brooks (1997), Varela, 
(1988), Winograd and Flores, (1986), 
Petitot (1985), Scott-Kelso (1995), 
Franklin (1995), Globus (1992), etc. 
have refused this representational model. 
Like the precedent critics they maintain 
that the concept of representation is an 
inadequate tool for describing dynamic 
informational systems. 
"Representation is the wrong unit of 
abstraction in building the bulkiest parts 
of intelligent systems. (Brooks, R. A. 
1997: 39 6)  
"It is the concept of representation which is 
insufficiently sophisticated" (Van Gelder, 
1993, p. 6) 
"We are not building representations at 
all!" (Thelen and Smith 1994, p. 338.  
But as we shall see, in spite of 
differences in terminology, most of the 
contemporary information processing 
models, be they static or dynamic, 
symbolic or not, rely on similar conceptual 
structure that are highly reminiscent if not 
identical to representational model. But 
they differ in the architecture of the 
dynamics of these representational 
structures. Hence a debate is born. It is 
polarized around the representational or 
non representational nature of information 
processing. But, like it or not, such a debate 
is basically a semiotic one. And in this 
paradigm one could ask if IPS are not,in 
fact semiotic processing machines?  
2-Information and representation.  
 
What is a representation? How 
does it relate to information. Contemporary 
theories often prefer the concept of 
information to the concept of 
representation, seeing there a strong 
theoretical difference. But one should 
remember that these two concepts have a 
common philosophical origin. Indeed, the 
concept (not the word) information is not a 
new concept in the field of cognitive 
theories. It was already at work in the 
medieval philosophy of mind. In the 
scholastic Aristotelian tradition, the soul or 
"anima" was defined as an agent that in its 
relation to the external world undergoes a 
cognitive ("cognitio") process. It had the 
capability (facultas) to transform a physical 
external object by changing its "materia" 
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into a "forma". The cognitive process 
was seen as one that renders present an 
external object in the agent but in a new 
form. It “re-presents” it. The cognitive 
agent is then said to be "in actu 
informata". Hence, being "informed" for 
an agent " is to possess a re-presentation 
of what is present outside of it. That is 
why for a cognitive agent the type of 
processing it can realize can only be on 
representation, that is to say a 
"informatio"... And Poinsot, talking 
about cognition, formally identifies 
representation and information.  
“[... ] est uius representatio et 
exercitium significandi informando fit. 
” 
(Poinsot: I, q 1, 655a, 47).  
As one can see, in its medieval 
sense, in-formatio and re-presentatio 
share common properties. And one of 
them surprisingly enough, it is not 
necessary for them to be symbolic. It is 
only in the theory of abstract concepts 
that a representation may take a semiotic 
form, i.e. become a signum. And a 
signum is not necessarily a symbol. The 
thesis that representations are symbolic 
only comes later in philosophy. It is with 
Descartes that representations become 
symbolic entities and are identified with 
ideas. It is not surprising then that our 
contemporary understanding of 
information processing systems includes 
reference to « representations ». 
Although contemporary models of IPS 
differ in terms of vocabulary, we find in 
all of them this common foundational 
structure. In this very general 
perspective, all information processing 
systems manipulates not the external 
object present outside of them but 
something akin to their own internal 
structure. In this sense, all IPS 
manipulate information that is a type or 
other of representation. 
In fact, the use of the concept of 
representation is not wrong or incorrect. It 
is just very general. It only says that what a 
IPS manipulates is not the external objet 
that is present out there but something 
inside it. In this sense, a theory of 
representation for IPS is neutral in regard 
to the form this internal form will take. It 
does not say whether it is iconic, symbolic 
or causal. 
 
3-Three implicit theses.  
 
In spite of a vocabulary difference 
and because they call upon a general 
conceptual framework, all models of IPS 
must commit themselves to three implicit 
thesis : a semiotic, an ontological an 
epistemic thesis:  
3.1 -the semiotic thesis.  
A system that manipulates 
information implies that what it 
manipulates is in some way or other in 
relation to something else. Most of the time 
for an IPS, having information implies that 
it has rendered internally present (re-
presented) what is present outside of it. In 
other words, an IPS processes something 
that is not autonomous it itself, but 
something inside of it that is also in 
relation with what is outside of it. In 
classical semiotic theory, there are at least 
two ways this special relation can be 
though of. Firstly, it may be realized in a 
stipulative manner or by convention. This 
type of re-presentational relation is 
classically called non-natural and its 
prototypical form is symbolic. This is often 
encountered in artificial information 
systems where a programmer stipulates 
what are the “representation” the systems 
may possess. Secondly this representational 
relation can be realized through some 
causal process. If so, it is classically called 
natural and its prototypical form is, in 
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peircian terms, indexical. Natural 
systems realized this through transducers 
that causally relates them to what is 
outside of them, i.e. their environment.  
It hence follows from this 
distinction, that to be re-presentational it 
is not necessary for a system to 
manipulate symbols. It could be 
representational if it manipulates only 
indexical or causal representations. What 
the classical concept of representation 
stresses is only that there exists a means 
by which the environment is present in a 
new mode (or in a new form) in the 
system. This is often maintained in 
models of information processing system 
by distinguishing between data and 
information.  
I think of information as not existing out 
there in the environment. Information 
comes into being when minds process 
sensations."Dawkins 1987 p 5 
In other words, being 
representational does not imply being 
symbolic! Indexical and causal 
informational relation are re-
presentational. In this sense, information 
is but a new name for a causal 
representation. This is a position that has 
been taken by Peirce and repeated lately 
by Drestke 
Talking about information is yet a third 
way of talking about the 
fundamentally important relation of 
indication or natural meaning. 
Dretske: 1982: 58 
Hence, an information or a 
representation defines the mode under 
which the exterior world is present in a 
system. An information or 
« representation » is what comes in the 
processing unit, but originates from 
outside of it and in another form. In the 
symbolic type of representation the 
formula « stands for », gives meaning to 
symbols because they are grounded in 
stipulations or in conventions. In the 
indexical type, the same formula only 
means that what is present in the system 
and is the object of manipulation is 
causally related to the exterior of the 
system. In this perspective, the concept of 
information and the concept of 
representation, do not offer much 
theoretical difference.  
 
3.2-the ontological thesis.  
The second thesis is an ontological 
one. It maintains that a representation 
exists in some form or other and creates 
internal states in the system. In semiotic 
terms, they are it's internal state of affair 
and constitute the Umwelt (Von Uküll, 
1940) of the system.  
This ontological thesis originates 
from the fact that information or 
representations are quantified. IPS models 
say that they manipulate one or many of 
them. This means that they are committed 
to recognizing them a type of existence. In 
fact all models of IPS implicitly defines an 
identity criterion which is necessary for 
them to recognize when two 
representations or information are identical. 
That is, under what conditions are they 
similar? Two information are said to be 
identical if they offer some similar form or 
can be recognized as falling in an 
equivalent class.  
For some models of IPS, 
representations only have logical properties 
(Fodor); for others, they are strictly 
semiotic (Peirce, Eco) or symbolic (Newell 
and Simon, 1976). And they should be 
distinguished from their material 
properties. In this case, the identity 
criterion relates to the functional operations 
that can be applied to information. Two 
information are identical if they possess the 
same functional properties. Other models 
of IPS understand the existence as purely 
physical (Churchland, 1989, Varela 1988, 
Petitot, 1985 Penrose,1994, Van 
Gelder,1997 etc.). Information in these 
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models should not be confused with its 
functional structure. The identity 
criterion pertains to the physical nature 
of the transformation that can be applied 
to information. Two information are said 
to be identical if they possess the same 
physical properties.  
But in both types of models, it 
is not always clear if there is really a 
difference between the functional and 
the physical properties of information. 
Indeed, one must not confuse the 
functional or physical nature of a 
representation or an information with its 
material nature or its vehicle or carrier. 
Indeed, the material carrier of an 
information is something very different 
from its functional or it physical 
structure! For instance, if a system is 
presented with two identical information 
at different time, it must be the case that 
they are materially different. Still they 
may be functionally or physically 
identical! Functional structure depends 
on the operations the constituents have 
in a system. But this is also true for 
physical structures. The epistemological 
question is then to find a real difference 
between a functional structure and a 
physical structure.  
An IPS system does not deal 
with information as it does with the 
carrier of information. For instance it 
would say that a robot vacuum cleaner 
manipulates informational state about 
dust in a very different way it 
manipulates the dust itself. Storing 
information about dust is not the same as 
accumulating dust in its bag. An infoglut 
dust robot is not necessarily a dusty 
robot! And vice versa! 
So, ontologically, a 
representation always has a material 
carrier, but this does not suffice to 
explain its structural properties be they 
described in functional terms or physical 
terms. But whatever IPS model chosen it is 
always committed to an ontology.  
 
3.3  the logical thesis.  
The third thesis defended by all 
information processing models pertains to 
way the system relates to the internal state 
created in it. The thesis maintains that an 
IPS does not only create informational 
states, it operates on them in a certain way.  
[Information is] anything that can undergo 
dynamic changes and / or can be 
transmitted from one system to another. 
(Young, 1987: 19) 
If the ontological status of 
information is of the symbolic type, then an 
IPS will operate on them in a logico 
symbolic fashion. This means that the 
transformations of the internal states 
created are rule-governed. And hence they 
may be syntactical or compositional and 
are usually linear or sequential. In classical 
philosophy of mind, this type of relation of 
the system (mind) to its representation will 
take the form of epistemic attitudes and 
what is allowed as transformations on 
attitudes contents are logico linguistic 
transformation (Fodor, 1975). But if the 
information or representations are not of 
this ontological type, the operations may be 
quite different. If for instance they are 
natural or indexical, they are said to be 
submitted to physical laws? But still what 
are physical laws? Are they mechanistic or 
quantic? Are they probabilistic or not? Is 
substitution of identicals always possible in 
these states?  
Whatever position taken, the 
thesis maintains that the operation on 
informational states are different from the 
states themselves. And an informational 
processing model must commit itself to a 
type of possible operations it can apply to 
the informational states. Let us now study 
more in detail the nature of these “logical” 
transformations.  
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3.3.1Computational 
transformation.  
 
A main characteristic that these 
transformations are usually given is their 
computability. Indeed, when IPS 
manipulate information they are said to 
compute it. But one may ask if the 
concept computation the right one to 
explain the dynamics of information 
processing. Are IPS necessarily 
computational systems in the Turing 
machine sense? The answer to this 
question is not as clear as one may think. 
If we analyze more precisely 
the various type of IPS, what is basic is 
not the fact that there are computable 
machines but the fact that they apply 
transformation to their internal states. 
After having accepted their input all IPS 
are said to transform states of 
information into other states. In the case 
of symbolic systems these states take the 
form of propositions which are 
transformed “discreetly” into other 
propositions through some types or other 
of rules (usually inferential). And in 
non-symbolic systems, the states take the 
form of configurations which “ 
smoothly” transform one into the other 
through some thresholds or constraints. 
But the hard question is : Do these 
transformations have to be computable 
transformations in the Turing sense? The 
only answer we could give here is that 
from an ontological point of view, it is 
quite clear that many systems do not 
require that transformations take the 
form of rules which are typical of 
symbolic systems. There exist many non 
symbolic systems that realize 
transformations without such rules. 
Should these systems be called non 
computable? And hence they would not 
be information processing systems. 
Inversely, from a semantical point of 
view, one may ask if the only definition of 
computation can be given in terms of 
inferential rule and decidability. If so, all 
dynamic system that are not symbolic are 
non computable systems. Still, intuitively 
speaking, it is difficult to deny that such 
system do “ compute” because their 
transformation process is not inferential. 
Maybe, a revised definition of computation 
may become necessary. Some authors even 
believe that, from a syntactic point of view, 
the difference between inferential rules and 
a physical transitions rules is not that easy 
to identify. (Gardenfors1994; Setiono et all, 
1996) In this sense, physical 
transformations would all be described by 
inferential rules and vice versa. 
  
3.1.2Classification 
transformation.  
 
Another important property of IPS is that 
they privilege a special sort of 
transformation. They change the type of the 
states of the entities they manipulate. 
Indeed, the transformation of states in IPS 
are not just modification of material 
carriers. For if it were the case, a digestive 
system would be an IPS. Here, something 
more is realized. Indeed, the controlling 
devices operate as a partition of the inputs 
into some equivalent classes. Accepting an 
input always require a criterion that 
identifies the class to which each input 
should belong. In other words, information 
processing always applies classification of 
some sort to its inputs. Here lies an 
important difference between a purely 
material processing and an information 
processing. An IPS always realizes some 
sort of pattern recognition. Whatever enters 
an IPS does not simply transits through it. 
It is accepted if it is an instanciation of a 
class. And because of such a type of 
operation that it may cause a reaction in the 
whole system. Chalmers (1991) even 
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identifies information as patterns. This 
means that the input, when it enters an 
IPS is but an instance of a class. In 
logical terms it is an element type input. 
What is at the output is not the same 
object. It has been classified 
(intentionally or extensionally). And 
what comes out of the system is of 
another type. Hence a IPS is a classifier.  
 
3.4 IPS and the three thesis  
 
These three thesis- the semiotic, 
the ontological and the epistemic are the 
main characteristics of a representational 
theory of information. And we hold that 
they are at work in the various models of 
IPS, be they declared symbolic systems 
or non symbolic systems. Indeed, all IPS 
do not manipulate the external object 
itself but a substitution of it. Secondly in 
all IPS, this substitution creates one or 
many of internal states akin to the nature 
and structure of the system. And finally, 
all IPS apply some type or other of 
transformational operations on these 
states. Hence the representational theory 
implies subtitutivity, quantified 
existentiality and transformationality.  
Often these three theses go 
unnoticed and are entangled in a 
undifferentiated discourse. For instance, 
they are eminently present in the so 
called « mentalistic » or representational 
theories of information (Fodor 1975, 
Johnson Laird 1988, Pylyshyn, 1984, 
etc.) In these models, the semiotic 
relation is symbolic, the ontology is 
made of discreet states, and the 
transformation are logical. These theses 
are also present in sub- symbolic models 
of IPS (Smolensky,1988xx, Rumelhart et 
all 1987.) Here the semiotic relation is 
essentially causal, the ontologies are 
distributed states, the transformations are 
non discreet.  
But it is also more and more 
evident that these three theses are to be 
found in these models that explicitly refuse 
the concept of representation. (Scott-Kelso 
1995, Varela, 1988;Van Gelder, 1997; 
etc.). For even if they prefer the term 
information to that of representation, they 
still have to answer the question typical of 
representational theories such as 1) how is 
information related to the exterior of the 
system? 2) what is the ontological status of 
these information? 3) How do they operate 
on these information? A non 
representational theory of information 
processing would have to deny 
commitment on these three points.  
Still, there exist such machines. 
For instance, a vacuum cleaner is a non 
representational processing system. The 
internal object (dust) it processes is not a 
substitution of the object outside of it. The 
internal state of this object is identical to 
the exterior object. The operations apply to 
these object only change the spatial 
location of the object: At the end of the 
process the dust is in a small bag! No one 
seems to maintain that such a machine is an 
information processing system.  
4 -The architecture of basic 
representational systems.  
 
A close study of the structure of 
various models of IPS reveals that they all 
contain in fact two different levels of 
"systems" one elementary, the other 
complex. And both levels do not operate in 
the same manner. The “granularity” or the 
“resolutionality” of the constituents may be 
more and more refined and precise, but 
still, they all distinguish the properties of 
the elementary constituents from the 
combination of these elementary 
constituents into complex systems. 
 
The elementary constituents:  
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All IPS contain elementary 
constituents. They may vary in 
vocabulary and may be called modules, 
granules, morphs, atoms, etc. And they 
may be found in neurons, chromosomes, 
cells, etc. But whatever is their material 
carrier they are usually described by the 
main following features. They are basic 
machines that establishes a specific 
controlled correspondence between the 
inputs received and outputs produced. 
This can be shown in the following 
schema:  
con trol
P rocess in g
in scrip tion tra n scrip tion
 
FIG 1  
This basic "abstract" machine 
contains:  
a) an inscription device -b)a 
processor of some sort c) a controller d) 
a transcription device.  
The inscription device 
(transducers) transforms the input into 
some entity akin to the system. An 
internal state is thus created. The system 
is then said to be “informed”. The 
processing unit has these states go 
through tranformations. The controlling 
function defines the degrees of freedom 
of the process it self. The transcription 
unit transforms the results of the 
processing into a form that another 
system may receive.  
This schema is very general and 
classical. It is to be found in all models 
of information processing. In classical 
cybernetics and artificial models, it 
becomes a Turing Machine, (Ashby, 56, 
Turing, 1937, Von Neumann, 1957, etc.) 
or a grammar, a production system, etc. 
This schema is also found in dynamic 
models. For instance, in the 
connectionist models each neuron is 
basically a Turing machine (Franklin & 
Garson, 1989). In genetic models, each 
basic operation (mating, mutation, 
reproduction, selection etc.) is also a 
Turing machine. In fact, in all emergent 
and dynamic systems, there are usually 
some forms of basic constituents that are 
taken for granted, but if studied more 
precisely are often minute automata. And 
as we shall show later, it is not at this level 
that a real difference exists between these 
dynamic and emergent models and 
classical automatas.  
But what is important to notice is 
that all these elementary “ machines” are 
always determined by some controlling 
parameter exterior to them. (In fig. I the 
control arrow originates from the exterior 
of the system.) This aspect of “ automatas” 
is often neglected in their descriptions, 
mainly when it takes the form of a black 
box. In other words, the degrees of freedom 
allowed to the processing device are not a 
property of the states themselves neither of 
the processing device, but are always 
imposed on them by an exterior factor or 
agent. In the symbolic systems, the 
controlling devices are rules and grammars 
and they do not originate from the states 
nor from the processing device. They have 
to be either stipulated or learned. This is 
even more obvious in non symbolic 
systems where controls take the form of 
parameters, thresholds, limits, etc. Here 
too, they are exterior to the states 
themselves and to the processor. It is 
because of this “externality” that these 
elementary systems will have to be in 
relation with other systems.  
 
The preceding schema can be 
translated into a categorial description that 
defines this elementary process as the 
application of an operation Oi to its 
arguments (ei,..... ei), with the value its 
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delivers ek..this gives the following 
categorial expression:  
A basic IPS is : <Oi (ei,..... ei), 
ek > 
That is, the basic constituent of 
IPS can be seen as a transformation 
operation C applied to entities e (input) 
of categorial type i and produces entities 
e of categorial type k. (output).  
What translation renders more 
evident is that a precise definition of the 
criterion of identity of the operation Oi 
must be given so that it can be applied to 
its arguments. In so doing, we discover 
that the criteria are not the results of the 
system itself but are given to it by some 
exterior intervention (a programmer or 
another system).  
In semiotic terms, this schema 
can been understood as a basic " 
semiosis" machine, that is as a system 
that transforms inputs of some type of 
state and then has them go through 
controlled transitions where new types 
are created, and then ultimately 
transforms them into objects that another 
semiosis machine can accept. The 
operation does not have to be digital, 
discreet, symbolic or sequential. They 
may be parallel, non symbolic. All what 
is required is that they be parameter 
controlled. (See Meunier 1998 for an 
example) In category theory, this implies 
that there exist adjunct operation.  
 
 
 
Complex information processing 
systems.  
The preceding schema has 
presented the elementary constituent of 
all IPS. But such a basic constituent one 
cannot describe a complex information 
processing system. Even the simplest 
computer game could not be explained 
by such a schema. For real systems are 
not built out with one single such basic 
constituent but out of a multitude of such 
basic constituents. They all need to be 
connected to some exterior controlling 
parameter. A connectionist system for 
instance, is formed out of myriad of basic 
neurons. A brain depends on millions of 
basic cells. And each of these basic 
constituent is itself determined by some 
exterior parameter (for instance, its 
thresholds, a delta rule). This is why so 
many models of complex IPS must define 
the relations among these elementary 
constituents. How are they organized in 
order to manifest complex if not real 
information processing?  
In this paper we will study two 
main types of hypothesis about the nature 
of the combination of these elementary 
constituents into complex systems. The 
first proposes to see complex systems as a 
multilevel and hierarchical structure and 
the second sees them as multilevel but 
where the combinations is dynamic. 
  
Hierarchical architectures.  
 
The first type of architecture 
modeling the interaction between basic 
constituents is discreet, multilevel and 
hierarchical. Examples of these models can 
be found in philosophy (Fodor, 1975, 
Commins, 1989, Pollock 1989) psychology 
(Johnson Laird, 1989), artificial 
intelligence (Newell and Simon, 1976) and 
robotics (Albus and Meyster, 1996), 
intelligent agents systems (Bradshaw, 
1997). These models see information 
processing as the interaction between 
various types of discreet and autonomous 
elementary IPS. And complexity emerges 
from the interaction of this variety. There 
exist many models of these interactions. 
But we can distinguish in most of them the 
following main types.  
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 1) First, there is usually a 
perceptual and effector level type of 
constituent where sensory input and 
output are processes. This allows the 
direct causal relation of the system to its 
environment. 2) A praxiological level 
assures the manipulation of goals and 
motives for effective behavior. 3) A 
normative level manipulates parameters 
to which the system must conform. 4) 
An epistemic level insures the 
effectiveness of the system it self. 5) The 
Ipseic level allows some type or other or 
self identity for the system. 6) Finally, 
some systems will include conditions for 
learning the potentialities of these 
modules. Naturally, many variants are 
possible. 2 
What is important to underline 
here is the two following features. First, 
in this architecture, the levels are all 
interdependent, but most of them are not 
organized in a grammatical or 
syntactical manner. This means that the 
interaction of the various levels are not 
necessarily compositional or rule-
governed, that is, are organized by a 
Turing machine. For instance, a robot 
could perceive something at the 
perceptual level and this in turn could 
cause a movement of its effectors. The 
relation of these two events is not 
dependent on a logical rule. It is not a 
necessary sequence of events. For it 
                                               
2
 One may see these levels as 
very classical, they are isnpired by 
philosophical and semiotic theories of 
cognition (Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, 
Kant, Husserl, Peirce,) and 
contemporary ones (Dennett, 1978; 
Pollock, 1989; Clark 1993, etc.), These 
philosophers have repeatedly postulated 
them as necessary if not sufficient 
conditions for systems to be of the 
cognitive type.  
 
could be learned in a associative manner 
and only when so learned could it become 
a rule-governed behavior. This point is 
important, for it shows that, complex IPS 
models do not defend a compositional 
structure. Their basic constituents may be a 
Turing machine but when combining these 
elementary constituents, some models 
abandon the compositionality that was 
previously so essential.  
Secondly, there are various types 
of levels in these complex systems because 
each does not entertain the same type of 
relation to the other parts of the systems. 
This renders them logically different. For 
instance, the perceptual processes relate the 
system to the environment. The 
praxiological ones touch upon the 
interaction of the system with goals. The 
normative ones may relate to parameters. 
The epistemic ones may operate on the 
effectiveness of the components of the 
system itself. The ipseic processes may 
give the system a self identity. In others 
words, in this approach an IPS complex 
system cannot be only a conglomerate of 
elementary processes. Each level seems to 
depend on the other to realize its own 
possibilities. 
 
 They often are the source of the 
controlling parameters. It is in this sense 
that it is hierarchical. This point is also 
important, for it show that the complexity 
can not relies on simply having the system 
relate to its environment. It must also 
possess elements that operate on the system 
itself. This contradicts IPS modeling that 
tends to reapply the “perceptual level “ i. e. 
the level that relates the system to its 
environment as the prototype of all other 
levels of IPS. In other words, complex 
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systems are not the simply “ 
complexification” of perceptual type of 
level. One cannot simply complexify a 
perceptual machine and upgrade it to a 
complex IPS.  
4.1 Associative Architecture 
 
More and more models of IPS 
systems present themselves not as mega 
hierarchical but as a complex dynamic 
systems. For instance, neural networks 
are not presented as a unique super 
neuron but as a complex associative 
interaction of neurons. Chaotic models 
are based on non linear interactions 
between various states of the system. 
And hence many models claim that the 
structure of complex systems cannot be 
explained in terms of hierarchy. Their 
organization is non discreet and non 
linear. They are said to be dynamical or 
emergent  
But if we compare the 
architecture of these systems with the 
preceding one, we discover some 
important similarities. First, as said 
above, they all rely on some basic 
constituents (neurons, genes, etc.) some 
of which receive input, others activate 
effectors. Secondly, they are implicitly 
multilevel, (cf. levels of neurons in 
connectionist models, levels of 
operations in genetic algorithms, etc.). 
For instance, Churchland and Sejnowski 
(1992) espouse a commitment to the 
hypothesis that "emergent properties are 
high-level effects that depend on lower-
level phenomena in some systematic 
way" Thirdly, parameters control all of 
them (weight, thresholds, activation 
functions, etc.) Some even have 
monitors of the systems, etc. In fact, one 
could see that these dimensions are 
instanciations of the perceptual, effector, 
normative, epistemic, and ipseic levels 
defined for the preceding architecture.  
But these models present also two 
important differences. Firstly, the 
interaction of the these modules is usually 
associative and are formally modeled 
through probability or statistics. That is the 
consolidation of the relation depend on 
either reiteration or cooccurences. They are 
not deterministic in that sense. But once a 
state is stabilized, these systems seem to 
behave exactly as a rule or a parameter 
governed system. Hence, the behavior of 
the whole system is not necessarily 
explained in terms of rules or grammar 
Secondly, these architecture relate 
to a hidden dimension not always explicitly 
present in the first architectures. Indeed 
they are all time indexed. That is, they 
include not only a model of the information 
path but also the patterns of transitions of 
the states of the system. And it is because 
of the inclusion of this time index that they 
can describe dynamic processes.  
5-Conclusion 
 
In semiotic terms, one could say 
that both of these multilevel architectures 
relate not mainly to the traditional concept 
of sign but to the less known concept of 
semiosis. Semiosis, at least for Peirce, 
pertains to the dynamic aspects of 
representational systems. It is a categorical 
process although not necessarily a syntactic 
one. Most of all it is a pragmatic one.  
In formal terms, we can say that 
these multilevel systems, neither the 
hierarchical or the dynamic ones are 
generated by some grammar or Turing 
machine. If we were to compare them to 
something linguistic or logic we would 
have to say that these structure, are more 
like texts or proofs than sentences or 
formula. As one knows, in language, only 
sentences or formula are rule governed not 
texts and proofs (even if many authors have 
hoped that it would be the case). Proofs and 
text cannot be generated by grammar. 
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 From a logical or functional 
point of view each two preceding types 
of models give a different answer to the 
question of how the numerous 
constituents in an information processing 
systems are organized into a coherent 
whole. The first type of architecture 
maintains that the structure of interaction 
is hierarchical. The second maintains 
that the interaction is associative or 
probabilistic.  
It follows that complex 
information processing system can be 
representational that is semiotic without 
being symbolic and with a syntactical 
structure. It could be purely associative 
and probabilistic. Hence a 
representational system can also be 
dynamic systems.  
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